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The conclusion of the twentieth century and the 
beginning of the twenty-first century has seen a tremendous 
explosion in the use of Information Technology (IT) in the 
business world.  One of the latest IT ventures has combined 
the centuries old auction marketplace Dynamic Pricing 
mechanism with today’s nearly instant communications in the 
IT environment. The result has been the development of 
price auctions for products and services via the Internet.   
United Airlines held a Jet-A fuel reverse auction on 
February 8, 2001. The auction was for 140,350,000 gallons 
of Jet-A fuel for delivery to 10 airports and four pipeline 
terminals. 
Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) purchases all 
fuel for the Department of Defense (DoD).  DESC’s fuel 
purchase program is similar to United Airlines.  To 
determine the lowest overall laid-in cost for large 
purchase programs the following must be considered: 
· Multiple offers/sources for each product 
· Multiple requiring locations/destinations 
· Both FOB destination and FOB origin offers 
· Multiple distribution cost components and options 
This research explores the possibility of using 
Dynamic Pricing via online auctions to purchase bulk fuel 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PREFACE 
The conclusion of the twentieth century and the 
beginning of the twenty-first century has seen a tremendous 
explosion in the use of Information Technology (IT) in the 
business world.  One of the latest IT ventures has combined 
the centuries old auction marketplace Dynamic Pricing 
mechanism with today’s nearly instant communications in the 
IT environment. The result has been the development of 
price auctions for products and services via the Internet.   
During this same period of time, the Federal 
Government has been going through a self-reinvention 
process to capture significant efficiencies in how it does 
business.  Within this reinvention initiative, the Federal 
acquisition process has been on a constant lookout for ways 
to do business faster, better, and cheaper.  Recognizing 
the efficiencies gained by embracing the power of the IT 
revolution and also looking for innovative ways to engage 
the commercial marketplace, the Federal Government has 
begun exploring Internet auctions for its day-to-day 
business. 
Two types of auctions exist; reverse and forward. A 
reverse auction is defined as  
‘downward price’ auctions in which suppliers 
continue to lower their prices until the auction 
closes.  Buyers watch as anonymous competitors 
lower prices in real time. (Dollase)   
 




GCN Illustration by Michael J. Bechetti
 
Figure 1.1 Reverse Auctions (From Ref. 9). 
 
Conversely, forward auctions are ‘upward price’ 
auctions in which buyers compete by raising their prices 
until the highest bid is obtained. 
Within Federal Government acquisitions, the Department 
of Defense’s (DoD’s) Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) 
procures approximately $3.2 Billion worth of bulk fuels 
each year to support DoD and other Federal Agency 
operations throughout the world.  (Barnard)  In this role, 
DESC is the single largest buyer of bulk petroleum products 
in the world and is the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA’s) 
largest acquisition program.  Because numerous sellers 
provide fuel for DoD bulk fuel acquisitions, Dynamic 
Pricing via reverse auctions potentially offers cost 
savings to the Government. 
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B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
Given DESC’s significant role within the DoD 
acquisition system and the recent advent of Dynamic Pricing 
through Internet auctions, the potential exists for DESC to 
consider Dynamic Pricing auctions in their bulk fuels 
acquisition program.  This research will explore the 
background of DESC’s acquisition processes and the 
capabilities of Internet based Dynamic Pricing to determine 
if Dynamic Pricing can be effectively used to purchase of 
bulk fuel for DoD.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
· Is the Dynamic Pricing model a viable option for 
purchasing bulk fuel in the Department of 
Defense? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
· What is the background and history of Dynamic 
Pricing in Government procurement? 
· How does DoD currently buy and sell bulk fuel? 
· How is bulk fuel bought and sold in the 
commercial marketplace? 
· What is the background and history of Dynamic 
Pricing in the commercial bulk fuel market? 
· What issues support or limit purchasing bulk fuel 
with Dynamic Pricing? 
D. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
The scope of this thesis will include 
· A review of past and current Government Reverse 
Auction applications 
· An examination of DESC’s current fuel purchase 
program 
· An examination of United Airlines’ Jet A auction 
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· An analysis of steps necessary to employ dynamic 
pricing procurement in DESC’s purchase of DoD 
fuel 
Chapter II provides the history of Dynamic Pricing 
within the Federal Government and the bulk fuels commercial 
marketplace.  It examines bulk fuel management within the 
Federal Government while comparing and contrasting with 
commercial industry practices. 
Chapter III explains DESC’s bulk fuels acquisition 
program.  DESC’s purchase and sales procedures will be 
examined and commercial bulk fuels purchase procedures 
reviewed.  This chapter concludes by discussing the 
similarities and differences in the business practices of 
DESC and the commercial marketplace. 
Chapter IV analyzes the steps necessary to incorporate 
Dynamic Pricing into DESC’s bulk fuel purchase procedures 
and discusses the potential impacts of using auctions to 
purchase and sell bulk fuel for DoD. 
Chapter V makes recommendations as to whether Dynamic 
Pricing can or cannot be used to purchase bulk fuel for 
DoD.   Research questions are answered and conclusions are 
summarized.  The thesis concludes with suggested areas for 
further research. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis research will include the following steps: 
· Conduct a comprehensive literature search of 
Government reports, magazine articles, Internet 
based materials and other library information 
resources. 
· Review the DESC, Ft. Belvoir, VA procedures for 
purchasing bulk fuel 
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· Conduct interviews, either in person or by 
telephone, with fuel procurement specialists, 
market analysts, and senior contracting officials 
as DESC, Ft. Belvoir, VA 
· Conduct interviews, either in person or by 
telephone, with United Airlines 
After compiling all data, conclusions will be drawn 
and presented that explain why DoD can or cannot use 
Dynamic Pricing to purchase bulk fuel.   
F. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis will primarily benefit the DoD by 
determining if Dynamic Pricing presents a viable option to 
purchase and sell bulk fuels.  The specific benefits will 
be a thorough analysis of the issues involved in using 
Dynamic Pricing in DESC’s bulk fuels acquisition program. 
This will enable DESC leadership to make an educated 
decision on whether or not to pursue Dynamic Pricing. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This background chapter reviews the history of Dynamic 
Pricing in the Federal Government, uses of Dynamic Pricing 
in the bulk fuels commercial marketplace, and bulk fuel 
management within the Federal Government.  The chapter 
concludes by comparing and contrasting Federal Government 
and commercial business practices when buying bulk fuel. 
B. REVERSE AUCTIONS 
1. Introduction 
A revolutionary procurement tool called Dynamic 
Pricing has emerged into Government acquisition.  Dynamic 
Pricing, in the form of Reverse Auctions and Forward 
Auctions, promises huge Government savings in time and 
money while potentially increasing competition.  The 
purpose of this research is to determine whether Dynamic 
Pricing is an effective tool that offers substantial 
benefits to the Government for procuring and/or selling 
bulk fuels.  . 
2. Pricing Process  
An auction, either reverse or forward, is a process 
that involves approved offerors submitting bids to an 
enabler.  An enabler is a company that is contracted as an 
auctioneer.  Freemarkets has been the enabler in several 
U.S. Navy acquisitions (Dollase). The enabler 
electronically shows the bid to all the offerors.  The 
offeror’s name is kept confidential (FAR Part 15.505).  
Government buyers are able to view the offeror’s names.  
Auctions are new, however, some basic acquisition 
requirements have been established that include: 
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· Suppliers must be pre-screened and approved by 
the Government.  All qualifying suppliers are 
determined to be in the competitive range. 
· Suppliers submit technical offers to the buyers 
and are issued passwords into that particular 
auction 
· Only those suppliers who were provided passwords 
can participate or view the auction 
· All offerors maintain anonymity to all, except 
the Government buyers 
· All participants see a bidder number, not the 
competition's names 
· The buyers’ evaluation criterion can be based on 
either price or best value. (Roll) 
Reverse auctions began for U.S. Navy acquisitions 
after several reverse auctions were held in Pennsylvania 
with Freemarkets as the enabler.  The Naval Inventory 
Control Point (NAVICP) introduced the reverse auction 
concept as a result of a meeting brokered by Department of 
the Navy (DON) Chief Information Officer (CIO), Mr. Dan 
Porter, on 22MAR00. Mr. Porter had previous discussions 
with Freemarkets and felt that there could be some 
applicability for reverse auctions within Navy acquisition. 
(Murphy)  
While discussions favored procuring berthing equipment 
for shipboard upgrades, the first item procured with a 
reverse auction was recovery sequencers for aircraft 
ejection seats (Dollase).  NAVICP officials saw reverse 
auction as a tool that could increase competition and 
dramatically decrease prices. 
As depicted in Figure 2.1, auctions offer an 
alternative to the buying agency’s procurement officials 
after the contracting officer determines responsiveness and 
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responsibility.  The auction is an extremely useful tool 
when price and price related factors are the award basis.   
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Figure 2.1. Simplified Procurement Process (From Ref. 
9). 
 
The synopsis tells potential offerors exactly what is 
being requested and may also address certain qualifications 
requirements.  Once the procurement is synopsized, it is 
important, especially in a competitive situation, to allow 
sufficient time for responses.  A synopsis must be 
published in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) at least 15 
days before issuing of a solicitation; and at least 30 days 
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response time must be allowed to receive bids (for sealed 
bids) and proposals (with request for proposals). 
3. Request for Proposal 
The request for proposal is a type of solicitation 
where a proposal constitutes an offer that Government can 
accept to create a binding agreement. (FAR Part 15.201)   
4. Competitive Range 
The next crucial step in the procurement process is 
determining the competitive range.  Some guidelines for 
determining if a proposal is not in the competitive range 
include: 
· It modifies or fails to conform to the 
solicitation’s essential requirements or 
specifications to such an extent that it has no 
chance of being revised sufficiently to become a 
winner; 
· It does not represent a reasonable effort to 
address the solicitation’s essential requirements 
or clearly demonstrates that the offeror does not 
understand the solicitation’s requirements; 
· It contains design deficiencies of such magnitude 
that the necessary proposal correction or 
improvement would require a major revision or 
virtually an entirely new technical proposal; or, 
· It contains such major technical or business 
deficiencies or omissions, including unrealistic 
Pricing, that discussions with the offeror could 
not reasonably be expected to make it a winner. 
(Abney) 
If an offeror is outside the competitive range, the 
contracting officer must notify the offeror.  The 
contracting officer has to tell the offeror as soon as 
possible that their proposal will no longer be considered 
for award (Abney).  With auctions, offerors outside the 
competitive range are not allowed to participate.  An 
  11 
offeror who is in the competitive range and allowed to 
participate receives a password authorizing them to view 
the price bidding.  If an offeror receives a password they 
are only allowed to see the current price and a bidder 
number.  The actual name of the company with the best 
priced bid (i.e. the lowest in a reverse auction and the 
highest in a forward auction) is confidential.  Only the 
enabler and buying agency know all of the participants.  
The buying agency is not allowed to share the participants’ 
names with other offerors. (FAR Part 15.505) 
5. Responsive and Responsible 
An offeror is determined to be responsive when the 
response to the request for proposal is without deviations 
and exceptions.  Non-responsive proposals only apply in 
sealed bidding.  In competitive negotiated procurements 
responsiveness is not an issue because proposals can become 
responsive as a result of discussions. (FAR Part 15.201) 
An offeror is responsible if they are capable with 
capacity, have proven past performance, have no violations 
of trust or dishonesty, and are not on the debarred, 
suspended, or ineligible list. (FAR Part 9.104-1) 
6. Auction or Conventional Method 
Once proposals are analyzed for responsiveness and 
responsibility, the contracting officer (CO) has the option 
of using an auction or choosing the winning proposal by the 
conventional methods.  The CO could contract and award by 
negotiation methods. (FAR Part 15)  Alternatively, the CO 
can use an auction, as it does not constitute a violation 
of the FAR (Dollase).  The CO must exercise caution to 
conform to the FAR and sealed bid method of procurement 
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requirements. Sealed bidding shall be used if the following 
conditions exist: 
· Time permits the solicitation, submission, and 
evaluation of sealed bids 
· The award will be made on the basis of price and 
other price-related factors 
· It is not necessary to conduct discussions with 
the responding offerors about their bids 
· There is a reasonable expectation of receiving 
more than one sealed bid. (FAR Part 6.401(a)) 
As these conditions indicate, the sealed bid method is 
extremely structured.  With a sealed bid procurement, 
either a Firm Fixed Price or Firm Fixed Price with Economic 
Price Adjustment type contract must be used. 
However, price is not always the only factor used when 
awarding the contract.  Table 2.1 summarizes five reverse 
auctions held for the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and Bureau 
















30 June $2.8M or 




NAVICP Price Only 3 August $1.2M or 








CVN Camels  CINLANTFLT Best Value 7 September $9.9M or 
27% over 5 
years 
 
Table 2.1. Reverse Auction Summary (From Ref. 9). 
 
  13 
As shown in Table 2.1, evaluation criteria can include 
factors in addition to price, but the buyer must make 
evaluation criteria clear in the solicitation.  When 
contract award will be made based on factors other than 
price, the sealed bid method cannot be used. (FAR Part 
15.101)  
7. Award Contract Using Best Value Or Lowest Price 
As shown in Table 2.1, procurement officials can make 
contract awards based on best value via auctions.  The 
concept of best value continuum is defined in the FAR and 
states,  
In different types of acquisitions, the relative 
importance of cost or price may vary.  For 
example, in acquisitions where the requirement is 
clearly definable and the risk of unsuccessful 
contract performance is minimal, cost or price 
may play a dominant role in source selection. 
(FAR Part 15.101)   
The acquisition of medicine and the aircraft support 
equipment are prime examples of items that involve minimal 
to no risk.  The Government is authorized to weigh factors 
other than price, such as past performance and technical 
capability.  In a reverse auction case study, LCDR Murphy 
states, “it is important to note that the lowest bid does 
not have to be selected for contract award.  A ’Best Value’ 
determination can be made prior to contract award.”(Murphy)  
A best value assessment cannot be arbitrary and 
capricious. Tradeoffs involving cost and non-cost factors 
are highly encouraged to allow the Government to obtain 
high quality goods and services, even if a higher price is 
paid. The FAR states that, when using a tradeoff process, 
the following apply: 
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All evaluation factors and significant subfactors 
that will affect contract award and their 
relative importance shall be clearly stated in 
the solicitation; and 
The solicitation shall state whether all 
evaluation factors other than cost or price, when 
combined, are significantly more important than, 
approximately equal to, or significantly less 
important than cost or price. (FAR Part 15.101-1) 
Contracting officers have a responsibility to follow 
the rules, using common sense without favoritism.  If the 
buying agency feels a best value award should be made, 
justification must be documented in the procurement files. 
(Abney) 
Best value represents the Government’s optimum balance 
of technical feasibility, performance, and cost.  Best 
value implies that weights on either element, cost or 
technical excellence, must not be so overriding that the 
other becomes insignificant. (FAR Part 15.101-1) When 
contracting officers decide to make an award based on non-
cost factors, the offerors must be informed in advance so 
proposals can be prepared accordingly.  Table 2.1 shows a 
reverse auction for shipboard berthing that was awarded 
based on the lowest price technically acceptable.  The FAR 
states,  
(either add “…” before the or capitalize The)The 
lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) source 
selection process is appropriate when best value 
is expected to result from selection of the 
technically acceptable proposal with the lowest 
evaluated price. (FAR Part 15.101-2) 
Just as when using tradeoffs, the lowest price 
technically acceptable process requires that the 
solicitation clearly specify the basis for award.  However, 
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unlike best value, FAR Part 15.101-2 dictates that when 
using the lowest price technically acceptable: 
(1) The evaluation factors and significant 
subfactors that establish the requirements of 
acceptability shall be set forth in the 
solicitation …  
(2) Tradeoffs are not permitted. 
(3) Proposals are evaluated for acceptability but 
not ranked using the non-cost/price factors. 
(4) Exchanges may occur (see FAR Part 15.306) 
When evaluating the contract award continuum, best 
value tradeoffs are at one end of the spectrum and lowest 
price technically acceptable is at the other.  The 
competitive forces of the marketplace must be given full 
consideration.   
8. The Bidding Process 
Once the competitive range has been established, all 
participants are notified and given their passwords, 
authorizing them to see the most favorable bid.  The 
opening bid is displayed and participants make counter 
bids.  The buying agency monitors the prices via the 
enabler.   The Government reserves the right to close the 
bid at their discretion.  Buyers.gov officials state, 
The Government reserves the right to extend, 
close or cancel an auction event.  Complexity of 
the commodity and the complexity of the 
solicitation requirements are two significant 
considerations.  The level of activity in the 
auction process (especially lots of activity at 
the very end of the period) would obviously 
affect the Contracting Officer’s decision to 
extend the auction. (Buyers.gov)  
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If the period is within 60 seconds of closing and a 
bid is received, the auction period may be extended to 
allow a counter bid by all participants.  The extension 
promotes full and open competition and prevents a bidder 
from waiting until the very end to outbid everyone else. 
(Thomas) 
9. Advantages to Government 
Acquisition professionals Government-wide are excited 
about the new procurement tool at their disposal.  They are 
excited because of the potential for cost savings, 
increased competition, increased sourcing, and time saved 
during negotiations. (Dollase) 















Figure 2.2. Five Reverse Auctions Savings (From Ref. 9). 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1, significant savings have been 
realized at all Government agencies that have participated 
in reverse auctions. However, savings are not shown for 
Mobile MRI services because the contract was not awarded to 
the lowest bidder.  The award was based on best value. 
The Government claims to have saved over $14M from the 
auctions shown in the graph.  The savings are based on 
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differences between the independent Government cost 
estimate and final bids. (Dollase)   
Because the Government has realized substantial 
savings, an opportunity arises that could potentially allow 
the Government to purchase more of the item acquired in a 
reverse auction. Mr. Steve Timchak, a Buyers.gov program 
manager, suggested, “that the Government is incurring huge 
savings and if the solicitation is clear initially, the 
Government might be able to buy 20%-30% more of an item 
after the price is settled.” (Timchak)  This concept would 
be appropriate for volume purchases.  Presently price is 
based on a pre-determined quantity, but if a binding 
agreement is made beforehand, the buyer and seller could 
benefit from increasing the quantity. 
Another potential auction advantage to the Government 
is increased competition. Ideally competition will increase 
which will help generate the best prices while promoting 
full and open competition.  The sources of supply increase 
as exposure is increased for new suppliers.      
10. Potential Disadvantages to Government 
Healthy competition will force suppliers to 
efficiently adjust their costs to become more competitive.  
Better prices are the goal for the Government, but not at 
the expense of poor quality.  After speaking with a small 
business owner who participated in a reverse auction, he 
stated, “the competition is so keen that companies are 
beating each other by cutting corners” (SR Tech) The 
Government will have to ensure accurate and meticulous 
records are kept regarding performance.  Savings incurred 
and level of performance should not be inversely related.  
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If the buyer realizes huge savings the end-user should 
still receive a quality product or service. 
Post award documentation should be scrutinized to 
allow an accurate evaluation of past performance.  Firms 
are willing to compete, but some will do whatever it takes 
to win the award even if it means cutting corners or 
producing in the red.  A firm goes in the red when they 
agree on a price but cut costs too dramatically to win the 
award.  After a phone interview with MICRON Computers, a 
reverse auction participant, a sales representative 
expressed that,  
they dropped out of the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service (DFAS) computer reverse 
auction because for them to win they would be 
forced to cut costs too dramatically.(MICRON)  
MICRON wanted to retain the business but did not want 
to be forced to offer decreased service and quality.  Even 
though MICRON dropped out of the computer bidding, they did 
win an award in the reverse auction for “744 light and 729 
heavy-duty printers.” (GSA.gov) After dropping out of this 
bidding, MICRON did not consider the reverse auction to be 
a negative experience and look forward to participating 
again.   
To prevent nonperformance, contractors will be advised 
in the solicitation that nonperformance penalties will be 
imposed.  The Buyers.gov website claims that, 
the contract vehicle or solicitation should spell 
out what applicable FAR clauses apply.  Typical 
remedies are consideration, termination for the 
convenience of the Government, or disbarment. 
(Buyers.gov) 
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Contractors cannot afford to have their reputations 
tarnished by failing to perform.  The long-term effects may 
be more detrimental than the extra effort required to 
fulfill their contractual commitment.  Follow-on awards 
will be difficult to obtain if past performance carries 
significant weight in future auctions.    
Another potential disadvantage to the Government is 
that competition could decrease if companies refuse to 
participate in reverse auctions.  In an interview, Mr. 
Steve Timchak of Buyers.gov stated,  
Del Computers did not participate in the DFAS 
computer reverse auction.  The reasons they did 
not participate are because they don’t like 
competition and the auction was outside their 
business model, but Del uses the private auction 
to obtain parts and support of their own company. 
(Timchak) 
Unless reverse auctions are going to be mandatory, the 
number of firms reluctant and those refusing to participate 
should be monitored. Companies that participated but 
dropped out during the bidding need to be canvassed to find 
out if they plan to participate in the future.  If a 
company decides not to participate, the Government needs to 
document why.  The same tool used to increase competition 
could decrease quality competitors to the point that there 
is a high quantity of competitors, but they are not high 
quality competitors.  A vibrant and viable supplier base 
must be maintained and trends of firms dropping out or not 
appearing on the potential suppliers lists must be 
acknowledged. 
11. Buyer-Seller Relations 
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The most effective buyer-seller team is characterized 
by teamwork and collaboration.  Adversarial relationships 
must be eliminated.  The Government is apparently realizing 
significant savings through reverse auctions.  Suppliers 
could choose not to participate or reluctantly participate 
in a reverse auction because they might not view the 
auction as a “win-win” situation.  Some of the savings stem 
from profit, therefore, companies could assume an arms 
length relationship because they feel they are on the 
losing end of deal before the auction even starts.  Dobler 
and Burt state, 
A company’s purchasing organization should 
motivate its suppliers to participate in a 
mutually profitable buyer-seller relationship. To 
create such motivation fully, it is essential 
that both buyer and seller completely understand 
the mutual advantage of a continuing 
relationship. (Dobler and Burt, 1996, p. 218)  
A supplier could cut costs to compensate for the 
profit lost and decrease quality or service to compensate.  
A vicious cycle begins that could include: 
· Documenting the poor performance with threats of 
no follow-on business.  For this method to be 
effective, the supplier must feel they have 
something to lose from the lack of follow-on 
business. 
· The supplier gets more upset and does not improve 
because their profit margin is low. 
· The buying agency could threaten to terminate for 
convenience or put the supplier on the disbarred 
list. 
· Other firms could recognize the hostile 
relationship stemming from decreased profits and 
avoid Government business, eroding the supplier 
base as the Government seeks large savings.  
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12. Advantages to Industry 
When considering General Services Administration (GSA) 
schedule buys, industry is placed at an advantage with 
private auctions because,  
in a GSA Schedule buy environment three quotes 
are typically sought to conduct an efficient 
competition.   
Buyers.gov has the potential to expand that 
number significantly and therefore conduct 
efficient and effective competitions. 
(Buyers.gov)  
Industry and competitors are allowed to penetrate an 
account that was closed before.  
Some firms indicated that the enabler used determines 
the advantages and disadvantages of auctions.  For example, 
the owner of Spec-Built Systems, expressed,”when using Fed-
Bid a bid war frenzy is eliminated because the lowest price 
is not displayed, but whether a firm ‘leads or lags’ in the 
bidding.”(Spec-Built) In some circumstances, companies may 
be less inclined to bid 5%-10% under the lowest price if 
they do not know the exact bid; a company might lower its 
bid to win the award if it knows the exact price.  Showing 
if a company “leads or lags” rather than showing an exact 
price may create, more of a “win-win” atmosphere in some 
circumstances. Further research is needed to determine how 
bid information affects bidder behavior. Based on this 
research, better buyer-seller relations can be fostered in 
situations where both parties feel they are winning.  
With the Freemarket model, companies have a tendency 
to offer a bid that could very well be too low, but, 
according to a MICRON sales representative, a company could 
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offer low prices to show sales and growth in their 
quarterly statements (MICRON).  The enabler chosen to 
conduct the auction could affect the outcome. 
Another advantage to companies participating in 
auctions is that companies are allowed to instantaneously 
change their bid in response to another company’s bid.  
This aspect of auctions is an advantage to the Government 
and industry because competition is maximized. 
If the buyer is allowed to increase quantities after 
the price is agreed upon, the buyer is then able to move 
more inventory that otherwise might have been dead stock or 
surplus.  Firms that have purchased too much of an item can 
capitalize on the opportunity to eliminate excess.  Dobler 
and Burt state  
Excessive ‘forward buying’ is another common 
source of surplus materials.  Regardless of the 
reason for using this method of buying, it 
entails the hazard of surplus generation from 
obsolescence, deterioration, or excessive 
inventory. (Dobler and Burt, 1996, p. 604) 
Surplus management is critical when attempting to 
maximize profits and space, while minimizing dead stock due 
to over-ordering and slow-moving material. 
13. Disadvantages to Industry 
The biggest disadvantage to industry is when the 
auction award is based on price only.  Some companies have 
dropped from competition while involved in an auction 
because they wanted to avoid losing money.  In a phone 
interview, a Gateway sales representative expressed,  
Competition is so keen that companies are bidding 
at a break-even point or below cost to obtain 
business.  Gateway has even removed themselves 
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when quality would be compromised. (Gateway) 
Gateway feels quality and service could suffer in the 
long run.  Companies are engaging in strategic buys that 
could be detrimental to the buyer.    
The owner of Spec-Built emphasized that there is not a 
standard used in Government auctions.  Suppliers feel one 
clear set of guidelines should be established regarding: 
· Time limits – when will the bidding stop? Are 
extensions allowed if a bid is submitted in the 
last 60 seconds of bidding?  When Freemarkets was 
the enabler, extensions were granted; however, 
FedBid did not grant extensions.  Suppliers would 
like to counter offers if an offer is made in the 
last 60 seconds.  A common time limit convention 
needs to be posted and enforced. 
· Right Specifications – How are specifications 
sent to the suppliers? With FedBid, 
specifications are posted on a website bulletin 
board and are not easily read.  The display is 
difficult to understand, which can lead to 
confusion and failure to perform.  FreeMarkets 
uses a written request for bid. 
· Write-in bids – Are write-in votes permissible 
and if so can the bid be displayed for all to 
see.  The owner of Spec-Built participated in a 
reverse auction that allowed a write-in bid, but 
the bid was not made public.  Therefore, the 
other participants could not fairly compete.  A 
write-in bid should be public knowledge.  Both 
the Government and other suppliers benefit from 
maximum competition. 
14. Socioeconomic Goals 
Officials at Buyers.gov are fully aware of the need to 
promote socioeconomic interests.  Even though SR 
Technologies is a small business that won a significant 
DFAS contract, the owner feels reverse auctions put him at 
a disadvantage.  The increased competition and decreased 
  24 
prices can crowd out small business.  When the owner of SR 
Tech was asked how he was able to beat larger businesses in 
the DFAS printers award, he stated, “I had to be proactive 
and employ innovative cost-cutting measures in certain 
areas that big companies did not” (SR TECH) Mr. Timchak of 
Buyers.gov realizes the need for set-asides and has plans 
in the near future to use a tool called Efast.  Mr. Timchak 
states, “Efast is an aggregation tool that will compile 
purchase orders for potential volume buys that will be 
solely for 8(a) set-asides. (Timchak) Small business 
concerns can capitalize on the revolutionary procurement 
tool that will increase their business. 
C. DYNAMIC PRICING IN THE BULK FUELS COMMERCIAL MARKET 
The commercial marketplace has begun to use electronic 
business (e-Business) as a tool for fuel procurement.  
Several companies in the transportation industry, including 
United Parcel Service (UPS) and United Airlines, have 
successfully conducted online auctions to obtain bulk fuel.  
United and UPS used the American Petroleum Exchange (The 
Exchange) which is “a single web site that can post, bid, 
award, dispatch and process term bid business.” 
(Apexchange.com)  
Launched October 2, 2000 The Exchange delivers over 
412,000 gallons of fuel every business day. Using the 
exchange allows companies to build on their success, 
leverage technology and become more efficient in the new e-
petroleum landscape.  “The Exchange has completed over 300 
auctions and awarded 105 million gallons from UPS, FedEx 
Ground and Consolidated Freightway”(Apexchange.com).  The 
Exchange advertises the following conveniences to their 
clients:  
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One-Stop-Shop for all your fuel procurement needs 
— With a flexible platform to handle many types 
of transactions from OPIS related or even NYMEX, 
access to dozens of suppliers, to clearing deals 
and delivering product all on one easy-to-use 
website.  
Automated fuel procurement platform driven by 
cutting-edge technology provided by Arthur 
Andersen, Sun MicroSystems, Oracle, Remedy, 
Ariba, and Exodus.  
Dedicated and creative Management Team with over 
150 years’ experience in the petroleum industry.  
Supplier Relations Team to analyze your offers 
and put you in touch with potential buyers.  
Streamlined Back-Office Solution staffed with a 
team of professionals to electronically link all 
your invoices, payments, contracts, credit, 
dispatching, and paperwork.  
Your own personal Liquidity Manager to help you 
with your procurement strategies and walk you 
through every transaction.  
An online Bid Template to help you formulate and 
post your bid in a matter of minutes.  
Price Discovery Center to keep you updated on all 
the latest market information, spot, rack and 
NYMEX prices, and breaking industry news.  
Large pool of qualified Suppliers ready to make 
offers on your business.  
Reports Database to compile your transaction data 
and generate analyses on your bids/offers, 
competing suppliers and potential winners.  
Team of Client Services Representatives available 
around the clock to answer your questions and 
serve you.  
Robust IT Infrastructure to make your 
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transactions run smoothly at all times.  
Seven Reasons You Should Use The Exchange For 
Your Term Bid Business  
Proven Success: In the first month of operation, 
The Exchange conducted 300 auctions and awarded 
105 million gallons of fuel from three of the 
nation’s largest fuel buyers to 15 suppliers.  
Cutting-Edge Technology: The Exchange built a 
system utilizing best-of-breed technology to 
handle all the “leg work” of buying fuel.  
Simplicity: All you have to do is complete an 
online bid template and let The Exchange 
automatically upload the information onto our 
system. The Exchange will handle the rest.  
Detail: You tell us your fuel requirements. From 
volumes and delivery locations to delivery 
requirements and specifications, you decide.  
Control: You decide the time frame of your bid 
and The Exchange will incorporate it into your 
requirements.  
Flexibility: You can use whichever pricing method 
you wish, including: fixed, index (OPIS rack 
city, OPIS Spot, Platt’s Spot and NYMEX) or 
posted pricing.  
Market Knowledge: The Exchange provides you with 
real-time pricing, market information, trends, 
commentaries, all on our website and all for 
free. (Apexchange.com) 
In addition to the reasons listed above, the exchange 
has helped companies save time and resources by eliminating 
phone calls, faxes, and hundreds of invoices; all 
information is centralized.  Purchasing fuel via The 
Exchange also allows access to suppliers that could 
potentially be located hundreds or thousands of miles away. 
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United Airlines First to Harness E-Commerce for Fuel 
Buying.  Determined to drive down fuel buying costs, United 
Airlines was the first airline to tap new Internet-based 
technology to buy its jet fuel.  United selected the 
American Petroleum Exchange, a neutral marketplace that had 
already completed over 1,700 diesel fuel and gasoline 
transactions, to host The Exchange's biggest deal to date, 
a 140 million gallon jet fuel auction in early February 
2001.  Fuel purchased through The Exchange flowed to over a 
dozen airport storage terminals, including Chicago, Los 
Angeles, New York and Miami, starting March 1, 2001. 
(Apexchange.com)  
Bob Sturtz, United’s Director of Petroleum Purchasing 
states that,  
With jet fuel prices at such high levels, United 
felt they owed it to their stockholders and 
customers to capture the power of e-commerce to 
maximize fuel-buying efficiencies.  United 
Airlines’ goal was to significantly drive down 
the costs of buying, dispatching, tracking and 
paying for fuel.  United executives believed The 
Exchange offered the best opportunity to achieve 
these goals. (Apexchange.com) 
D. BULK FUEL MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) serves as the 
single point of entry for all bulk fuel bought and sold by 
DoD worldwide.  In fiscal year 2000, DESC purchased over 
$3.1 Billion worth of bulk fuel to support this mission. 
(Barnard) DESC coordinates seven commodity business units, 
which includes Bulk Fuels.  In 1995, DESC reorganized from 
traditional, functional structures to commodity business 
units (CBUs) combining all functional specialties required 
to deliver support in that commodity. 
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The director of the Bulk Fuels CBU acts as principal 
advisor and assistant to the Director DESC in providing 
global support for contracting, distribution, 
transportation, and inventory control of bulk fuels 
including jet fuels, distillate fuels, residual fuels, 
automotive gasoline’s (overseas only), specified bulk 
lubricating oils, aircraft engine oils, fuel additives such 
as fuel system icing inhibitor, and crude oil in support of 
the Department of Energy Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
Program.  The director also sells excess petroleum 
products. 
The Bulk Fuels CBU is further divided into four 
divisions, including Inventory and Distribution Management, 
Contracting, Quality Operations, and Product Technology and 
Standardization. (Barnard) 
1. Inventory and Distribution Management Division 
(DESC-BI) 
The Inventory and Distribution Management Division 
manages the inventory and distribution of petroleum 
products purchased and delivered in bulk quantities to 
support military and federal operations.  These bulk 
petroleum products are primarily military specification 
aviation and shipboard propulsion fuels, but also include 
lubricating oils, additives, and motor gasoline.   
The division is made up of three branches. The 
Requirements and Inventory Control branch (Code BIB) 
consolidates military and federal requirements for bulk 
petroleum products into purchase programs, executes these 
programs, and manages bulk petroleum inventories throughout 
the world. The Distribution Branch (Code BID) has two sub-
units: the Operations Team (Code BIDO) and the Rates Team 
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(Code BIDR).  The Operations Team sets and monitors 
compliance with transportation policy, works closely with 
the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to obtain 
needed services, and formulates/executes the transportation 
budget needed to distribute bulk petroleum products.  The 
Tanker Operations Branch (Code BIT) schedules and 
coordinates the ocean movements of bulk petroleum products 
from suppliers to oceanfront Defense Fuel Support Points 
(DFSPs).  This effort uses a core fleet of five chartered 
ocean tankers, and periodic movement of bulk petroleum 
products via spot chartered ocean and coastal tankers.  The 
Military Sealift Command (MSC) provides Ocean tanker 
transportation, and the Tanker Operations Branch maintains 
constant close liaison between MSC, oceanfront DFSPs, and 
regional managers. (desc.dla.mil) 
2. Contracting Division (DESC-BZ) 
The Contracting Division acquires assigned bulk fuel 
items worldwide. The predominant items are aviation and 
ship fuels.  The division also purchases Bulk Lube Oils, 
negotiates product for product exchange agreements, 
negotiates excess petroleum products sales, performs 
contract administration for all contracts and sells and 
purchases crude oil to support the Department of Energy’s 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve Program. (desc.dla.mil) 
3. Quality Operations Division (DESC-BQ) 
The Quality Operations Division provides Center 
Quality Assurance support to all DESC CBU Contracting, 
Supply, Transportation and Facility staff.  This division 
also develops policy, programs and procedures for 
implementing fuel quality assurance and quality 
surveillance. The division is also quality subject matter 
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experts for quality assurance and quality surveillance 
within the Defense Fuel Regions/Offices, Military Sealift 
Command, Military Traffic Management Command, and Defense 
Contract Management Command personnel.  Additionally, the 
division serves as the focal point for fuel or fuel related 
customer/depot complaints. (desc.dla.mil) 
4. Product Technology and Standardization Division 
(DESC-BP) 
The Product Technology and Standardization Division 
provides DESC overall technical support for products 
purchased for its customers (except natural gas).  In this 
capacity, the division also serves as DESC representative 
at NATO and other industry/Government forums addressing 
product specification issues. (desc.dla.mil) 
E. SUMMARY  
When considering bulk fuels sales and purchases, the 
commercial marketplace and Government share similarities 
and differences.  The most significant common ground is the 
need to coordinate numerous buyers and sellers.  Both 
commercial industry and Government share the fact that the 
ultimate fuel destinations and the potential sources need 
to be efficiently matched at a fair and reasonable price.   
In an effort to expand and connect the bulk fuel 
marketplace, commercial industry, most notably United 
Airlines and United Parcel Service, has wholeheartedly 
embraced the eBusiness concept. On the other hand, 
Government has not explored the use of Dynamic Pricing to 
date in its purchases and sales.    
Dynamic Pricing is an innovative business practice 
that has potential to bring the worldwide marketplace 
together.  As United Airlines and UPS have done, Government 
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and DESC stand to empower themselves by employing Dynamic 
Pricing. The potential efficiencies include increased 
competition, getting the best price, best value, and better 
allocation of resources.  
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III. COMMERCIAL AND DOD BULK FUELS ACQUISITION 
PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines both the commercial and 
Department of Defense bulk fuels acquisition programs.  It 
concludes by discussing of the similarities and differences 

































Figure 3.1. DESC Bulk Fuels (From Ref. 3). 
 
B. DESC/DOD BULK FUELS PROGRAMS 
As depicted in Figure 3.1 the Defense Energy Support 
Center (DESC) is the world’s single largest procurer of 
fuel, and has the enormous responsibility of obtaining fuel 
for the Department of Defense in the most efficient and 
cost effective manner.  Because DESC has numerous suppliers 
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and customers spread throughout the globe, sound business 
practices that maximize resources and minimize cost are 
mandatory.  Recognizing the demand for savings and quality, 
DESC has streamlined services that feature the technical, 
contracting, and marketing expertise needed to make highly 
informed and successful energy management decisions. 
(desc.dla.mil) 
DESC’s Contracting business unit employs techniques 
that effectively procure of bulk fuel.  The effort of 
buying and selling bulk fuel is accomplished in three 
phases that include demand forecasting, pre-award, and 
award. 
1. Demand Forecasting 
DESC acquisition professionals forecast demand by 
evaluating input from sources such as customers, past 
sales, regional data, and current contracts. Another 
important tool used by DESC is the Defense Fuels Automated 
Management System (DFAMS).   
 
Major DFAMS Applicat ions
























Figure 3.2. Major DFAMS Applications (From Ref. 14). 
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, DFAMS is a database that 
has numerous applications, each of which has an effect on 
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demand forecasting.  DFAMS provides important data to the 
Bid Evaluation Model (BEM) that is discussed later in this 
chapter while also generating sales data that is essential 
for the initial purchase program review. 
After combining the results of exercises, mission 
changes and the applications in the illustration above, the 
next step is using the Fuels Automated System (FAS).  FAS 
monitors transaction volume and has a tremendous impact on 
DESC.   
Before placing a request for fuel, requirements must 
be validated by the Requirements Manager (RM).  The RM has 
several factors that must be validated before deciding to 
issue a working purchase request. The requirements factors 
include: 
· Peacetime consumption 
· War Reserve Program 
· Draw downs 
· Build 
· New tank inventory build 
· Maintenance and repair 
· Current contract status (Kinard) 
The requirements process summarized in Figure 3.3 
illustrates that DESC employs a systematic approach. 
























Figure 3.3. Requirements Process (From Ref. 14). 
 
The requirements manager (RM) carries a large 
responsibility in the requirements process. The RM is 
accountable for ensuring the following tasks are completed:  
· Simplified purchase request and solicitation 
documents 
· Electronic routing/ coordination 
· Export requirements directly to the BEM 
· Import award information from the BEM (Kinard) 
The requirements manager must successfully integrate 
all information available to afford cost and time-effective 
bulk fuel procurements.  The RM ensures all purchase 
requests include  
· Item description 
· Delivery date  
· Quantity  
· Mode of delivery 
· Delivery restrictions 
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· Quality requirements/specifications 
· Seasonal restrictions 
· Additives  (Kinard) 
All the above items must be incorporated into the 
purchase request to ensure timely, accurate, and complete 
delivery of the requested fuel.  Miscalculations, 
misinterpretations, and unclear requirements equate to an 
unsuccessful procurement, which ultimately leads to a 
dissatisfied customer, wasted time, effort, and money.   
DESC employs Requirements Data Call (RDC), which is an 
internet-based application designed to electronically 
process fuel requirements for DESC-solicited items from 
local activities to the DESC Inventory Manager. (Kinard) 
Using information technology in this manner assures 
efficiency by decreasing the chance of mistakes and keeps 
information flowing continuously. 
2. Preaward 
The preaward process is a key element to successfully 
acquiring bulk fuel for DoD.  In preaward the following 
occurs: 
· Receiving and verifying the purchase requirement 
· Planning the acquisition 
· Soliciting offers 
· Reviewing offers 
· Negotiating and finalizing offers (Kinard) 
The preaward phase serves three important purposes 
including (1) providing the basis for legally sufficient 
contracts, (2) conveying accurate requirements and 
associated conditions, and (3) incorporating all current 
regulatory and legislative provisions (Kinard). 
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Figure 3.4. Pre-award Process (From Ref. 14). 
 
Satisfying these purposes offers the buying 
organization legal protection, thorough and precise 
communication, and strict compliance with local and 
Governmental directives.   
Figure 3.4 depicts the pre-award process and 
illustrates the essential elements involved with the 
progression of a bulk fuel requirement.  The bulk fuels 
procurement process would be incomplete and grossly 
inefficient without following the steps described in Figure 
3.4.   
Upon receiving the purchase request (PR), the 
contracting officer verifies the fuel requirements, 
specifications, cost/price, modes of transportation, and 
the previous year’s program. Simultaneously, the 
contracting officer must constantly consider the inventory 
manager, and consider quality. 
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Before moving forward and posting the requirement in 
the Commerce Business Daily (CBD), an acquisition plan must 
be devised that includes: 
· Description of requirements 
· Purchase history 
· Extent of competition 
· Problems 
· Price range 
· Socio-economic programs 
· Methods of acquisition 
· Negotiated 
· Sealed bid 
· Full and open competition 
· Economic Price Adjustment 
· Market survey/research 
· Milestones (Kinard) 
The acquisition plan is an invaluable tool and assists 
in meeting the organization’s and the end-user’s needs.   
While each of the items listed in the acquisition plan 
is important, DESC concentrates on socio-economic programs. 
Socio-Economic Procurement Programs (SEPP) are important 
for the organization and economy as a whole and SEPP’s 
significance is evident in the bulk fuels procurement 
process. As illustrated in Figure 3.4, the Small Business 
Office (SBO)_ ensures SEPPs are included in the acquisition 
plan.  The BEM takes SEPPs into account before an offer is 
made available for an unrestricted run. 
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3. Effects of the BEM on the Award Process  
After determining the requirement, but prior to 
awarding a contract for bulk fuels, DESC must determine a 
fair and reasonable price while efficiently matching 
multiple sources with multiple requiring 



























































Figure 3.5. Award Process, (From Ref. 14). 
 
DESC recognized a problem in determining the “lowest 
overall laid-in cost” for large purchase programs that 
contain: 
· Multiple offers/sources for each product 
· Multiple requiring locations/destinations 
· Both FOB destination and FOB origin offers 
· Multiple distribution cost components and options 
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Additionally, distribution costs include: 
 
· Operating cost for ocean tankers, barges, tank 
trucks, pipelines 
· Excess thru-put charges and environmental fees  
· Terminalling costs for tariff agreements 
· Additive injection (Kinard) 
The solution to combining the numerous variables is a 
mixed integer linear program called the Bid Evaluation 
Model (BEM). Figure 3.5 illustrates how DESC employs the 
BEM. Ragsdale states, 
mathematical programming (MP) is a field of 
management science that finds the optimal, or 
most efficient, way of using limited resources to 
achieve the objectives of an individual or a 
business.  For this reason, MP is often referred 
to optimization. (Ragsdale, 2001, p. 16) 
Optimization clearly describes the BEM, as the BEM’s 
ultimate goal is to balance numerous cost variables to 
minimize the total cost of delivered fuel.  Unlike other 
DoD supply centers, DESC considers distribution costs up 
front rather than as part of the overhead/surcharge that 
accrues after the product is purchased.  When using the 
BEM, and in accordance with the theories of linear 
programming, the decision variables are the multiple 
offers/sources of Refined bulk fuel with are composed of 
both FOB destination and FOB origin offers.  The 
constraints are the required fuel volumes at the multiple 
requiring locations/destinations, operating costs for 
various modes of transportation, distances between multiple 
sources and destinations, environmental fees, and additives 
for the different types of fuel. Figure 3.6 illustrates 
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numerous methods of transporting bulk fuel to the end user. 
The methods include oil tankers, pipelines, and trucks.   
 
Figure 3.6. Methods of Transporting Bulk Fuel to End 
Users (From Ref. 14). 
 
Ragsdale states, 
In routing and logistics the amount of 
merchandise available at the warehouse and the 
amount needed at each store tends to fluctuate, 
as does the cost of shipping or delivering 
merchandise from the warehouses to their 
locations. Large amounts of money can be saved by 
determining the least costly method of 
transferring merchandise from the warehouse to 
the stores (Ragsdale, 2001, p. 17) 
Ragsdale observes the importance of costs savings, and 
it is for this precise reason DESC uses the BEM.  All of 
the variables affecting cost (i.e. distance and mode of 
shipment) from the source to the ultimate destination are 
considered in the BEM. As an example, the region shown in 
Figure 3.7 is DESC’s East/Gulf Coast procurement region.  










Figure 3.7. DESC East/Gulf Coast Region (From Ref. 14). 
 
DESC manages its purchase program by dividing the 
globe into four regions labeled Inland/West, East/Gulf 
Coast, Atlantic/European/Mediterranean, and Western 
Pacific.  Of the four regions, 80% of the volume is bought 
in the United States. (Kinard) While DESC recognizes that 
aggregated requirements establish the substantial 
quantities that attract the world’s largest oil companies 
and provide for the associated price breaks commensurate 
with volume purchasing, DESC splits the world into these 
four “procurement programs” for the following reasons: 
· DESC’s volumes are so large that no single 
refinery, or geographic group of Refineries, can 
fulfill the entire requirements. 
· Creating separate purchase programs and 
staggering their procurement timing assures DESC 
will always have some quantity of product on 
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contract in case a problem arises with any one-
purchase program. 
· Splitting the total worldwide requirement into 
these smaller programs is necessary to create 
linear programming problems that are not so large 
they cannot be solved by current state of the art 
computers. (Barnard) 
In the 1996 example shown in Figure 3.7, there were 32 
offerors, 209 requiring locations, and five different 
products.  When considering the various modes of 
transportation summarized in Figure 3.6, the multiple 
offerors and requiring locations of Figure 3.7, reasons for 
the BEM are clearer.  The BEM is used to obtain the lowest 
overall program cost.  Although an individual offeror may 
have the lowest laid-in cost to a particular location, the 
offeror may not actually be awarded the quantity if that 
particular quantity is needed to meet another offeror’s 
minimums that will result in lower total program costs .  
The BEM considers each of these variables and makes 
literally millions of calculations to determine the best 
combination of awards. 
The contract evaluation depicted in Figure 3.8 
illustrates the multiple paths of how one company’s product 
can be delivered to just one requiring location via 
multiple transportation modes.  There are several arcs to 
get to each node or hub.  In the overall contract 
evaluation, every offeror’s product is evaluated for every 
requiring location via all combinations of delivery modes.  
The linear program (BEM) then sums all of these alternative 
combinations to determine the lowest total cost for the 
entire purchase program.  It is this process that generates 
the millions of calculations the BEM processes during each 
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evaluation.  The BEM helps DESC contracting officers, like 
any prudent businessperson, establish the best business 
deal for their customers.   
Although not shown in Figure 3.8, the BEM includes 
both transportation costs and distribution costs, such as 
throughput minimums and maximums of the various locations 
and modes, costs of additives, and excess throughput 
charges. 
 


































Not displayed: transportation minimums/maximums, excess throughput charges, additive charges, etc..
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Figure 3.8. East/Gulf Coast JP5 Evaluation (After Ref. 
14). 
 
Initial observations indicate that a cost 
determination could be made for one price at one location, 
however, the lowest overall program cost must always be 
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considered, as in the BEM.  The BEM determines the 
successful supplier for each destination and how the fuel 
should be delivered to the destination through the network. 
The aggregation of the solutions for all destinations is 
the minimum cost solution for the entire purchase program. 
C. COMMERCIAL AIRLINE PRACTICES FOR BUYING BULK FUEL 
The commercial airline industry has bulk fuel 
requirements that are similar to those of DoD.  However, 
the commercial airline industry does not have requirements 
that span the globe.  Additionally, the vast majority of 
the commercial airline requirements exist in locations 
(commercial airports) that are serviced by dedicated 
commercial pipelines, as opposed to many of DoD’s 
requirements that exist at remote installations without a 
commercial distribution infrastructure.  As a result, the 
commercial airlines have meaningful competition for fuel 
deliveries directly to the airports, without arranging for 
independent distribution of the fuel.  Therefore, the 
commercial airlines do not use a linear programming model 
that accounts for the numerous variables that comprise a 
DoD bulk fuel buy.  The commercial airlines industry is 
able to identify a requirement for a particular location, 
solicit offers, and award based on lowest cost bid for that 
specific requirement on an FOB destination basis.   
D. CONCLUSION 
While the Defense Energy Supply Center and the 
commercial airlines industry share common ground, there is 
significant difference in their buying practices and goals. 
The similarities are that both seek to maximize 
efficiency and minimize cost by optimizing the numerous 
sources and requirements.  However, the difference between 
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the two is in the size of the bulk fuel purchases and the 
means of getting fuel from refineries to requiring 
locations.  DESC is seeks the lowest overall cost for the 
aggregated program versus the lowest cost for one 
particular buy. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although Dynamic Pricing in the form of Reverse and 
Forward Auctions is becoming more prevalent in the DoD 
acquisition community, the complexities of DoD’s fuel 
buying processes introduce some interesting complications 
to the Dynamic Pricing model.  This chapter examines some 
of the issues involved with incorporating Dynamic Pricing 
into DESC’s BEM evaluation process. 
B. OPINIONS AND CONCERNS OF THE CURRENT PROCESS 
PARTICIPANTS 
To establish a basis for implementing Dynamic Pricing 
in DESC’s bulk fuel acquisitions, the researcher surveyed 
the current process participants.  One survey was 
distributed to the DESC workforce while the other was sent 
to DESC suppliers.  The full survey responses are contained 
in Appendices A and B. 
1. Socioeconomic Concerns  
In the surveys, both the DESC workforce and a portion 
of the DESC supplier base expressed concern over how the 
reverse auction process would affect DESC’s current 
application of the Government’s socioeconomic programs.  
Specific concerns included: 
· How is this going to affect our small 
disadvantaged business set-aside? (Appendix A) 
· We are a Small Disadvantaged Business and do not 
feel this approach would meet the requirements of 
the program. That is, we should not have to 
compete in an open auction against all of the 
other Refiners. (Appendix A) 
· The potential to pay higher prices under the 
various socio-economic premium programs.  
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Currently the small businesses offering under a 
premium program must still offer their best price 
at Final Proposal Revision or risk being priced 
higher than the maximum premium price thereby 
being eliminated from consideration.  Under 
reverse auctioning the offerors under these 
programs would be able to maximize the premium 
amount they would receive because they would be 
able to see the apparent low price. (Appendix B) 
DESC adheres to a robust Socioeconomic Procurement 
Program (SEPP). The BEM is run in a manner that takes into 
account all areas of socioeconomic concerns. SEPP 
Classifications are Small Business, Small Disadvantaged 
Business, Women-owned Small Business, Section 8(a) 
applicants, and HUBZone Small Business Concern.   
To accomplish the goals of the SEPP, under DESC’s 
current procedures, they conduct an initial BEM run to 
establish the “fair market price” of the products being 
purchased.  This satisfies the requirements of FAR 19.807 – 
Estimating Fair Market Price.  This BEM run is composed of 
all of the product offers on an unrestricted basis.  
Therefore the solution from this BEM run is the equivalent 
of a fair market price in an unconstrained marketplace.  
After the fair market price is obtained, 8(a)s are allowed 
to match that price. If the 8(a)s are able to match the 
fair market price, the 8(a)s contract awards (quantities 
and prices) are then “locked in” to the BEM in the form of 
problem constraints.  Subsequent BEM runs then 
allocate/award product in succession to the hierarchy of 
socioeconomic groups until a final BEM run determines the 
awards for the unrestricted portion of the acquisition 
program. 
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This researcher believes that Dynamic Pricing’s 
Reverse Auction can be used with the BEM, but must be 
incorporated with the initial base run for SEPPs.  Using 
Dynamic Pricing after the initial base run creates the 
potential for SEPPs to earn a higher price premium, which 
was presented in the DESC Workforce survey, because the 
social preference companies would then be able to price 
their product after having seen the apparent winning 
prices.  By incorporating the Reverse Auction into the 
initial base run of the BEM evaluation process, all 
offerors would be on the same “playing field” as they were 
in the historical process, but would have the market 
insight afforded by the Reverse Auction process. 
Under the Reverse Auction process envisioned by this 
researcher, it would not be apparent to the offerors who 
had won what quantities and at what prices at the auction’s 
conclusion.  The offerors would have only been afforded the 
opportunity to revise their prices after having seen the 
first/previous auction round’s prices and associated 
transportation/distribution costs.  This process is 
presented in more detail later in this chapter. 
Of interest, this concern would only be applicable to 
DESC’s domestic purchase programs as the U.S. Government’s 
socioeconomic programs are largely inapplicable to 
contracts performed overseas.  Therefore, DESC could 
incorporate Reverse Auctions into their overseas purchase 
programs, which represent approximately 20% of their bulk 
fuel buys, at a value of over $800M/year, without this 
concern. 
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2. Lowest Total Program Cost vs. Lowest Single 
Source of Fuel Cost 
As presented in Chapter III, DESC’s acquisition 
philosophy is based on achieving the lowest cost for the 
entire purchase program, not just the lowest cost for any 
individual requirement within the purchase program.  This 
is the rationale for DESC’s BEM evaluation tool, which 
solves what is known in linear programming as a “total cost 
minimization problem.” 
Concerning this acquisition approach, both the DESC 
workforce and a portion of the DESC supplier base expressed 
concern over how the reverse auction process would affect 
DESC’s current “Lowest Total Program Cost” philosophy.  
Specific concerns included: 
· Reverse auction for one location with one price 
is simple.  How do you handle multiple locations, 
multiple prices, and multiple pricing intervals? 
(Appendix A) 
· I'm not sure how DESC can make their Bid 
Evaluation Model and the Reverse Auction concepts 
work together. (Appendix A) 
The difficulty is in applying the complex algorithms 
of the Bid Evaluation Model to the reverse auctioning 
process.  Because the Bulk programs purchase large 
quantities of fuel on an FOB Origin basis for subsequent 
distribution to hundreds of end-use activities, the 
evaluation process must include the potential to distribute 
the offered product to hundreds of locations by up to five 
different methods of delivery.  These offers compete 
directly against FOB destination offers to the same 
locations.  The complexity of this evaluation process 
requires a linear model that often runs for more than 
twenty-four hours to reach a final solution. (Appendix B) 
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The current Bulk procurement process derives the 
OVERALL lowest laid down price for ALL products to be 
procured in the solicitation.  The reverse auction process 
would require separating these products into individual 
auctions.  This would result in inefficiencies in the 
procurement and the loss of the ability to “trade off” one 
product against another in order to find the mix of awards 
that result in the lowest price to the Government. 
(Appendix B) 
The goal of Dynamic Pricing is to create a competitive 
environment that yields the lowest cost for the buyer.  A 
typical Dynamic Auction is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Typical Dynamic Auction (From Ref. 9). 
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In Figure 4.1 the price of $1.2M is shown as the 
absolute highest price.  After approximately one hour and 
ten minutes the competitive forces of the marketplace have 
forced the price down to $990,000 from an initial bid of 
$1.120M and the auction is closed at that final price. 
The researcher believes that the “classic” Dynamic 
Auction shown in Figure 4.1 is not suited for DESC.  Under 
the classic approach, the lowest price seen by the auction 
participants on the interactive screen directly correlates 
to the price that must be beat to win the contract.  
However, the individual offered prices in DESC’s case are 
almost meaningless without seeing their associated 
conditions: minimum required volume to be awarded, maximum 
volume available, tiered pricing for associated volumes, 
associated distribution costs, etc.  These associated 
conditions are all of the variables the BEM considers when 
determining the lowest total program cost.  For this 
reason, the offerors should see all of the conditions 
associated with all of the offered prices to make educated 
price revisions. 
DESC’s BEM currently produces several reports that 
contain all of the costs used to evaluate each individual 
offer.  Instead of a classic reverse auction where offerors 
see their competitor’s current bids, a DESC reverse auction 
should provide the offerors with the BEM evaluation 
details.  In this manner, an offeror would be able to see 
how much volume, if any, they are currently winning and how 
their offer stacks up against the competition.  Absent this 
information, raw prices are of little value to the 
competitors. 
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Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 are samples of portions of 
the current reports produced by the BEM.  All of this 
information is currently made available to all offerors in 
an automated format via DESC’s web site, after contracts 
are awarded.  Incorporating this data into Reverse Auctions 
would require adapting this process to make this 
information available to the offerors during the Reverse 
Auction process.  To keep offerors confidential as required 
by the FAR, the BEM output would need to be sanitized to 
disguise the offerors names. After the names are disguised 




Figure 4.2. BEM Bid Evaluation Sheet (From Ref. 7). 
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Figure 4.4. BEM Rate Report (From Ref. 7). 
 
Providing this information through a classic Reverse 
Auction would give offerors the opportunity to make sound 
decisions and adjustments in all areas affecting their 
offered fuel price while preserving the integrity of DESC’s 
BEM evaluation and award process.  Adopting this process 
would also allow DESC to be in total control, both 
physically and financially, of the Reverse Auction process, 
thus avoiding the effort and cost of a middleman “enabler” 
typically used in the classic Reverse Auction process. 
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3. Higher Prices? 
All of the literature and publicity on the Reverse 
Auction process touts lower prices as one of the main 
benefits of the concept. Interestingly, both the DESC 
workforce and a portion of the DESC supplier base expressed 
a different opinion on the potential price outcome.  
Specific comments included: 
I'm not sure if you have thought of this aspect, 
but the reverse auction will probably allow us to 
RAISE our prices in some instances.  Over the 
years we have often bid very aggressively in 
order to win the contract only to find out we 
have left money on the table. That is, our price 
was lower than it needed to be.  The reverse 
auction visibility will allow us to adjust our 
prices upward after seeing what the award pattern 
is looking like. (Appendix A) 
The potential to pay higher prices because 
offerors can see the apparent successful prices 
and can avoid under bidding and leaving money on 
the table. (Appendix B) 
Will we have full visibility of current 
transportation rates and other costs that are 
considered with our offer? If so, this would be a 
great improvement over the current blind-bidding. 
(Appendix A) 
The difficulty in establishing a benchmark to 
determine if the auctioning process produces cost 
savings and for increased sales prices relative 
to traditional solicitation procedures. (Appendix 
B) 
At first glance, the idea that the Reverse Auction 
actually results in higher prices could be easily dismissed 
as a misunderstanding of the process.  However, given that 
both the buyer and sellers in the DESC relationship raised 
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this possibility, it appears real. In fact, this outcome is 
most likely to occur when there are large differences 
between the prices sellers are willing to offer, and there 
are sellers that are anxious to win the contract in 
question. It is less likely if prices are similar across 
suppliers and suppliers are not as anxious to win the 
contract if winning requires a low profit margin. 
This phenomenon would be similar to the functioning of 
the commercial residential real estate market.  In that 
business environment, if a buyer is purchasing a house in 
an area that they perceive has a very active and 
competitive real estate market, they may very well make a 
“full priced” or higher priced offer to make sure they get 
the house of their choice.  This could result in what is 
commonly called “buyer’s remorse.” However, if they engage 
the services of a local real estate agent and thus obtain 
visibility into the recent sales prices for similar homes, 
they may find that they can make a lower offer and still 
“win” the contract to buy the house.  In this case, they 
would be satisfied that they had purchased their house at a 
competitive market price. 
Following this analogy, the Reverse Auction can be 
seen as a similar form of the market visibility provided by 
that real estate agent.  With this knowledge of the current 
marketplace, firms may not have to be as aggressive in 
their pricing. 
The question then becomes, is this potential for 
higher prices bad?  In short run it represents a higher 
cost for DoD.  However, in the long run avoiding “seller’s 
remorse” may actually create a better relationship between 
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DESC and their suppliers.  This is all based on the concept 
of reaching an equilibrium price in the market. 
Following this logic, the fact that the reverse 
auction process allows the offerors to make more educated 
or enlightened offers, should provide a good cure for the 
“seller’s remorse” possible in the current DESC acquisition 
process.  This would simply mean that the DESC’s contracts 
have found the marketplace’s true equilibrium price without 
any accompanying supplier discomforts.   
4. Time Concerns 
The Reverse Auction process has been advertised as a 
significant time saver in the Government acquisition 
process.  However, recent research at the Naval 
Postgraduate School has found that several DoD suppliers 
believe the process actually takes more of their time, vice 
less. (Fabby) In this research, the DESC workforce and a 
portion of the DESC supplier base surveys expressed similar 
concerns.  Specific comments included: 
Please make sure it does not increase the already 
long time from offer to award. (Appendix A) 
We are so time pressed now to get the awards made 
and often are waiting on BEM runs.  I don’t know 
where there is any time left to run the reverse 
auction. (Appendix A) 
…we have to make several BEM runs to accommodate 
each of the social programs.  Not sure how or 
where the reverse auction can fit in. (Appendix 
A) 
As with most Government procurements, time is always 
of the essence.  The concern for time actually has two 
elements, the actual time required to conduct the auction 
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and the time required to perform the analysis necessary for 
formulating a proposal price. 
Regarding the time required to conduct the auction, 
the current literature typically presents the Reverse 
Auction as a time saver.  This opinion assumes that revised 
prices are received and subsequently analyzed in a real 
time environment.  In the single item,  single location 
price used in a classic Reverse Auction, this holds true 
from the Government’s perspective.  However, this classic 
case ignores the effort required for offerors to make 
multiple, iterative pricing decisions in a time compressed 
environment.  As documented in LT Fabby’s research and 
echoed in this research, Reverse Auctions may actually 
increase the amount of time an offeror has to spend with 
every procurement.   
Incorporating Reverse Auctions into DESC’s 
acquisitions would require their suppliers to now make 
multiple pricing decisions as the auction takes place.  
Given the dynamics of all of the factors the BEM considers 
in determining the program’s lowest total cost, this is no 
small task for the offerors.  As such, multiple bidding 
rounds, after each successive BEM run, are probably 
unrealistic.  DESC may be limited to just one or two 
bidding round. 
Likewise, every time DESC receives revised prices, the 
only way for DESC to evaluate revised prices is to conduct 
another BEM run.  One BEM run can take several hours or 
several days to derive a solution.  Recognizing this 
limitation, DESC is probably limited to two bidding rounds 
in their domestic purchase programs using today’s existing 
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BEM technology and processes.  However, DESC’s overseas 
purchase programs could conceivably run multiple bidding 
rounds in closer to a real time interactive environment. 
Because Dynamic Pricing is conducted in a ‘real time’ 
environment, and the length of a single BEM run can vary, 
using Dynamic Pricing and the BEM is not practicable, but 
is possible. 
5. Product Sales 
In addition to the major areas addressed above, the 
following issue was identified in the surveys: 
· Sale of fuel, forward auction is doable.  They 
are usually based on FOB origin only offers and 
no social programs. (Appendix B) 
· Potential increase in efficiencies and interest 
in our rare sales of refined product. (Appendix 
B) 
· The potential to maximize price for product 
sales. (Appendix B) 
In addition to DESC’s role in purchasing bulk fuel, 
they periodically sell fuel that either no longer meets the 
required product specification or is located in an area 
where there is no longer a requirement and it is not 
feasible to move the product to another location for 
consumption.  In these sales, the product is typically sold 
on an FOB origin basis, so there are no transportation or 
distribution costs to be factored into respective price 
offers.  As such, the BEM does not play a role in awarding 
these sales contracts.  Therefore, the Forward Auction 
concept would appear to be well suited for these programs. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the opinions and concerns of the 
current participants in the Government’s bulk fuels 
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acquisition process.  The individual issues were presented 
and analyzed to determine if and how DESC could incorporate 
Dynamic Pricing into their processes. Attention focused on 
socio-economic concerns, and comparing between the lowest 
total program cost and the lowest single source of fuel 
cost.  Chapter V will present the final conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
· Is the Dynamic Pricing model a viable option for 
the purchase of bulk fuel in the Department of 
Defense? 
Yes, Dynamic Pricing is a viable option.  However, as 
analyzed in Chapter IV, using of Dynamic Pricing within 
DESC has complexities that do not exist with commercial 
airlines or with the simpler Reverse Auction acquisitions 
conducted by DoD to-date.  The intricacy of Socio-economic 
concerns is captured in the BEM.  The numerous BEM runs 
required for domestic fuel programs complicate the Dynamic 
Pricing model.  Therefore, the “classic” Dynamic Pricing 
models are not practicable.  A modified version of the 
Dynamic Pricing model displaying all costing elements would 
be feasible for DESC. 
Because Socio-economic issues are not a concern with 
overseas programs, several BEM runs are not necessary; 
therefore, the current Dynamic Pricing model is more of a 
viable option for DESC’s overseas programs. 
DoD could also use forward auctions to sell fuel on an 
FOB origin basis that no longer meets Military 
Specifications, or is no longer required in a particular 
area but movement is not practical. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
· What is the background and history of Dynamic 
Pricing in Government procurement? 
Several Reverse Auctions using Dynamic Pricing have 
been conducted for items ranging from mobile medical 
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services to shipboard berthing. Savings of up to 28% have 
been realized when compared to Independent Government Cost 
Estimates. 
· How does DoD currently buy and sell bulk fuel? 
To buy fuel DoD issues an RFP, receives offers, and 
uses the BEM to determine the overall laid-in cost for each 
of the four designated regions around the world. 
· What is the background and history of Dynamic 
Pricing in the commercial bulk fuels market? 
United Airlines conducted a Reverse Auction on 
February 8,2001 for 140,350,000 gallons of Jet A fuel.  The 
American Petroleum Exchange (APEX) served as the enabler.  
United Parcel Service (UPS) has also used APEX to conduct 
online auctions. 
· What issues support or limit purchasing bulk fuel 
with Dynamic Pricing? 
Issues Supporting: 
· Driving prices down with ‘real-time’ online 
competition  
· Increased visibility of prices  
· No Socioeconomic concerns overseas 
Issues Limiting: 
· Long BEM runs and the potential for more time 
required to conduct the auction  
· Domestic Socio-economic concerns 
· Dynamic Pricing only shows the lowest price. DESC 
considers several cost factors and conditions. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
As discussed in Chapter I, this thesis evaluates using 
Dynamic Pricing when purchasing bulk fuels for the 
DoD.Background research was conducted to compare commercial 
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and Government bulk fuel acquisition programs.  Both 
programs share the need to efficiently match sources with 
destinations, however, the Government program is more 
complex. The complexity of the Government program is 
captured in the Bid Evaluation Model linear program that 
solves for the minimum total overall program cost.  
Commercial acquisition programs are designed to seek the 
lowest cost for a single source of fuel.   
The BEM and its numerous iterations are the biggest 
factors inhibiting use of Dynamic Pricing.  However, the 
purpose of the BEM is to solve for the lowest overall laid-
in cost; Therefore, it is possible that the savings 
incurred from using the BEM are similar to the cost savings 
resulting from using Dynamic Pricing. 
Analysis in Chapter IV revealed the concerns and fears 
of the DESC workforce and its suppliers.  Incorporating 
Dynamic Pricing into DESC’s BEM process is complex and must 
formulate a solution comprised of many variables. 
Therefore, the commercial airlines Dynamic Pricing 
application involving single buyers and sellers is not 
comparable.  
Thoroughly examining the Dynamic Pricing model and 
DESC’s BEM shows that the two concepts are not easily 
combined, and in most cases (domestic programs) Dynamic 
Pricing not feasible.  Integrating Dynamic Pricing in 
overseas programs is possible, however. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the conclusions above, this thesis offers the 
following recommendations: 
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· DESC and Suppliers receive training on reverse 
auctions 
The enabler is capable of training both parties.  The 
enabler could also clarify how confidentiality is 
established and maintained throughout the bidding process.  
NAVSUP has awarded contracts to two enablers, eBreviate and 
Procuri.com who will provide training as needed. (NAVICP 
News release) 
Training would ease fears and concerns to first-time 
participants and make potential Reverse Auctions run more 
efficiently.  Training will also create dialog and identify 
possible pitfalls and obstacles. 
· Perform a trial Reverse Auction  
DESC would gain valuable knowledge by performing a 
trial Reverse Auction for research purposes only.  The time 
required to run the BEM is a major concern.  DESC should 
use an enabler and display the minimum cost sheet elements 
on the Dynamic Auction and (1) determine if displaying the 
elements is feasible and (2) determine how long the BEM run 
combined with Dynamic Pricing would take.  The time and 
funding for this effort would allow DESC officials to make 
an informed decision supported with data when considering 
Dynamic Pricing. 
· Maintain current BEM practices 
The BEM is efficient and can be used with a custom-
made Dynamic Pricing model tailored to display BEM 
conditions affecting lowest total program cost. 
· Employ Dynamic Pricing with Overseas Programs 
Socio-economic issues do not affect overseas programs: 
Therefore, numerous BEM runs are not required.  Lessons 
learned from the overseas programs should be documented and 
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used as a foundation for expanding the Dynamic Pricing 
concept domestically. 
D. SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES 
This thesis has addressed several important issues 
that could potentially save the Government money.  However, 
further research remains in the following areas:  
· How many pricing rounds are feasible with the BEM 
and Dynamic Pricing? 
The BEM is known for its time-consuming runs, but more 
runs could be required to consider socio-economic concerns 
if using Dynamic Pricing. 
· Buy-In Prevention/Implications with Reverse 
Auctions 
The potential exists for contractors to underbid to 
obtain the contract.  Documentation needs to be maintained 
and tracked for non-performance and defaults. 
· Applications of Reverse Auctions in DoD 
 Additional research should be conducted to 
determine the items that are most suited to Reverse 
Auctions. 
· Effects of Reverse Auctions on Socioeconomic 
concerns 
Research should be devoted to the effects of Reverse 
Auctions on socio-economic concerns.  A study should be 
conducted to determine the potential negative and positive 
outcomes.  
· Joint Operations Analysis & Acquisition Effort  
Additional research is warranted combining the 
theories of operations analysis and acquisition to develop 
an interactive ‘real-time’ BEM capable of supporting a 
‘real-time’ Reverse Auction. 
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APPENDIX A.  DESC SUPPLIER SURVEY RESPONSES 
      2) Yes, but with some concern. 
3) We would participate because of the substantial 
volumes of fuel that DESC buys. We cannot afford to 
ignore that business. However, I'm not sure how DESC 
can make their Bid Evaluation Model and the Reverse 
Auction concepts work together. Please make sure it 
does not increase the already long time from offer to 
award. 
5) Although we would be willing to participate, I'm 
sure there are Refiners who will not for either 
technical or other reasons. 
 
2) The Government jet market is too big to ignore. 
3) How do you make sure the bids are confidential?  
Does this require any new hardware or software on our 
end?  How does this affect small businesses? 
5) The harder you make it to do business with the 
Government, some companies are going to throw in the 
towel. 
 
2) No choice 
3) How is this going to affect our small disadvantaged 
business set aside? 
5) Just about all it can do is decrease competition. 
Just about everybody in the business goes after the 
Government contracts today. 
 
 
2) This is such a large part of our business we can 
not afford not to. 
3) Reverse auction for one location with one price is 
simple. How do you handle multiple locations, multiple 
prices, and multiple pricing intervals? 
5) Although we can't afford not to pursue Government 
business. I'm sure there are refiners out there who do 
business with you today who will be turned off by this 
new process and take their business elsewhere. 
 
 
2) I'm not sure if you have thought of this aspect, 
but the reverse auction will probably allow us to 
RAISE our prices in some instances. 
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3) Over the years we have often bid very aggressively 
in order to win the contract only to find out we have 
left money on the table. That is, our price was lower 
than it needed to be.     The reverse auction visibility 
will allow us to adjust our prices upward after seeing what the 
award pattern is looking like 
5) See the answer to #2. 
 
 
2) As long as the reverse auction process does not 
cost us a significant amount of money to participate; 
hardware, software, etc, we would continue to pursue 
Government contracts. Also the reverse auction would 
allow us better visibility of how we can price our 
product lower or higher to win the volumes we desire. 
3) Will we have full visibility of current 
transportation rates and other costs that are 
considered with our offer? If so, this would be a 
great improvement over the current blind-bidding. 
5) Ther really isn't anybody else out there who isn't 
going after Government contracts already. So all that 
could happen is a decrease if it scares somebody away. 
 
2)We are a Small Disadvantaged Business and do not 
feel this approach would meet the requirements of the 
program. That is, we should not have to compete in an 
open auction against all of the other Refiners. 
3) How will reverse auctions support the SDB 
community? 
5) If the SDBs are not protected, we will leave. 
 
2) We think this greatly improves the visibility into 
the source selection process and the current 
associated factors. Under the current system all we 
know is who played last year and what the associated 
costs transportation rates were. With reverse auctions 
we will be able to make much more educated bids. 
3) Making it work with the BEM  
5) I selected decrease, but actually don't think it 
will have any effect. 
 
Responder #9 
2) I think the improved visibility into the decision 
process that Reverse Auctions give is a tremendous 
advantage to all of us. 
3) None 
5) No effect 
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APPENDIX B.  DESC WORKFORCE RESPONSES 
Give the offerors visibility of the competitive price they 
need to beat.  
 
If they really want/need the contract they can act 
accordingly. 
 
Potentially receive lower prices 
 
QT2. Bid Evaluation Model (BEM).  We are so time pressed 
now to get the awards made and often are waiting on BEM 
runs I don't know where there is any time left to run the 
reverse auction.   
 
Socioeconomic programs.  Sort of goes along with the BEM, 
but we have to make several BEM runs to accommodate each of 
the social programs. 
 
Not sure how or where the reverse auction can fit in. 
 
QT3. Sale of fuel, forward auction is doable.  They are 
usually based on FOB origin only offers and no social 
programs.   
 
On the purchase side it is going to be FOB Destination only 
offers would eliminate the BEM but the additional cost of 
buying fuel would not be worth it. Faster BEM processing 
time could free up time for auctions but we are using the 
current state of the art computers now and still run into 
many hour or several day BEM runs. 
 
QT1. Potentially lower prices. Allow Refiners to feel more 
in control of the source selection process as it is now 
they submit their prices in the blind and are left at the 
mercy of the BEM process 
 
QT2. BEM complications just too hard.  
 
Responsiveness of the Refiners they all have to be willing 
and able to participate in the auction at the same time. 
Small business issues.  We have set asides and partial set 
asides in the programs.  How can they be accommodated in 
the reverse auction 
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QT3. Only do the reverse auction AFTER the set asides have 
been accomplished for the unrestricted portion of the 
program 
 
Qt1.  The potential to obtain lower prices through direct 
competition. Potential increase in efficiencies and 
interest in our rare sales of refined product.   
 
Most of these involve sale of product that no longer meets 
military specification.  
 
The potential to maximize price for product sales.   
 
QT2. The difficulty in establishing a benchmark to 
determine if the auctioning process produces cost savings 
and for increased sales prices relative to traditional 
solicitation procedures.   
 
The potential to pay higher prices under the various socio-
economic premium programs.  Currently the small businesses 
offering under a premium program must still offer their 
best price at Final Proposal Revision or risk being priced 
higher than the maximum premium price, thereby being 
eliminated from consideration. Under reverse auctioning the 
offeror under these programs would be able to maximize the 
premium amount they would receive because they would be 
able to see the apparent low price. 
 
The potential to pay higher prices because offerors can see 
the apparent successful prices and can avoid underbidding 
and leaving money on the table.  
 
The difficulty in applying the complex algorithms of the 
Bid Evaluation Model to the reverse auctioning process. 
Because the Bulk programs purchase large quantities of fuel 
on an FOB Origin basis for subsequent distribution to 
hundreds of end-use activities 
 
The evaluation process must include the potential to 
distribute the offered product to hundreds of locations by 
up to five different methods of delivery.   
 
These offers compete directly against FOB destination 
offers to the same locations.  The complexity of this 
evaluation process requires a linear model that often 
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runs for more than twenty four hours to reach a final 
solution. 
 
The inability to tie various products together in the award 
process.  The current Bulk procurement process derives the 
OVERALL lowest laid down price for ALL products to be 
procured in the solicitation.  The reverse auction process 
would require the separation of these products into 
separate auctions.   
 
This would result in inefficiencies in the procurement and 
the loss of the ability to trade off one product against 
another in order to find the mix of awards that result in 
the lowest price to the Government. 
 
The following is provided as further explanation and 
example of some of the primary obstacles to using reverse 
auctioning in Bulk Fuels procurements.  
 
For purchases of non-commercial items such as for ejection 
seat components for fighter aircraft where there is a 
historical group of contractors who have each been 
successful for previous contracts you can establish the 
apparent cost benefit by comparing the prices historically 
paid using traditional contracting methods with those paid 
using reverse auctioning.  Unfortunately it is much more 
difficult to calculate the potential savings for commercial 
items especially those commonly traded on the commodities 
market.  The commercial market place has already 
established the price that can be expected for the product 
and offers under Government solicitations tend to track 
very closely with the commercial market prices.  In these 
cases there is really no apparent benefit to using the 
reverse auctioning technique as the offeror already knows 
the lowest price they will accept as a function of the 
price they can receive on the commercial market and the 
auctioning process could actually be used to allow the 
vendor to fish for the HIGHEST price they can sell to the 
Government rather than submitting their most competitive 
price upfront.  
 
Example Company A offers to sell JP8 to DESC.  JP8 is 
comparable to commercial Jet A-1 sold on the petroleum 
commodity market.  Vendor A knows that he can sell his 
product on the commercial market at a June price of .50 per 
gallon.  After calculating his margins for volume sales he 
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has determined that the best price he can offer to the 
Government is below market.  
 
Under an RFP or FIB he then submits his best price as 49 
per gallon June prices.  Under reverse auctioning the 
lowest price he can accept remains below commercial market 
but he begins the auction by offering a much higher price 
of .60 per gallon.  As the auction progresses he continues 
to submit lower bids until he has either placed the 
successful bid at .49 or the price drops below his minimum 
acceptable bid and he withdraws. 
 
In both cases and the Government has not realized any cost 
savings from using the reverse auction technique.  Case 
also demonstrates the very high risk that the Government 
could actually pay a higher price to the vendor under the 
reverse auctioning practice. 
 
Item numbers are matched to the items numbers in item cause 
we are buying a group of products sharing characteristics 
with commercial items sold on the commodities market, the 
price we can expect to pay is already somewhat established 
for us.  We have been unable to determine a benchmark that 
would demonstrate how the reverse auction process would 
produce sufficiently better prices than the standard 
solicitation.  There is no evidence that the reverse 
auction process could save enough money to even justify the 
cost of the service. 
 
There is no way to prevent this from happening.  We know 
that this has happened under our Natural Gas reverse 
auction program costing DESC significantly higher prices 
for awards under the premium Programs  
 
Process that does not show actual price and only shows 
relative placement of the offer, i.e. Your offer is ranked 
etc can be used to minimize the risk.  Contractors will 
still be able to fish their way down to the winning price. 
 
The only way to eliminate this problem would be to break 
the procurement into a number of packages and to evaluate 
each one separately. 
 
This solution has its own problems as this would result in 
a loss of efficiencies afforded by evaluating the entire 
procurement together. 
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We do believe that there is some potential for the 
Auctioning process in the sale of DESC Bulk fuels products 
- although once again the issue of establishing a benchmark 
to measure success against must be resolved.  
 
These responses in this survey represent the opinion of the 
Chief of Contracting and five Contracting Officers in DESC 
Bulk Fuels.  These results should therefore be counted as 
the responses of six individuals. 
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APPENDIX C.  REVERSE AUCTION SURVEY (DESC) 
 
1. What are 3 - 5 reasons Reverse Auctions should be used 
to purchase and/or sell Bulk Fuel for DoD?  
 
 
2. What are 3-5 issues that could prevent or limit the use 
of Reverse Auctions in the purchase or sale of Bulk Fuel 
for DoD? (i.e. Bid Evaluation Model obstacles/issues)  
 
 
3. What solutions can you provide that will eliminate the 
reasons listed in question #2 and allow Reverse Auctions to 
be used to purchase and/or sell Bulk Fuel for DoD?  
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APPENDIX D.  REVERSE AUCTION SURVEY (SUPPLIERS) 
 
1. If the Government/DESC were to pursue the use of Reverse Auctions in 
its purchases and/or sales of Bulk Fuel, would you be willing to 
participate in these auctions?  
Yes  
No  
2. If yes, why? If no, why not?  
 
3. What fears or concerns, if any, would you like the U.S. 
Government/DESC to address before pursuing the use of Reverse Auctions 
for the purchase or sale of Bulk Fuel?  
 
4. Do you feel Reverse Auctions increase or decrease competition when 
used to purchase or sell Bulk Fuel?  
Decrease  
Increase  
5. Why do you feel competition is decrease or increased?  
 
 
Click Here to Send 
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